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Though traditional microeconomics has supposed that human decisions are based on logical 
and exact computation of cost-benefit balances or efficacies, studies in behavioral economics have 
shown that humans sometimes make seemingly irrational decisions driven by emotions. In our 
everyday situations, factors related to decisions are complex and which alternative will be the most 
beneficial is uncertain. In such cases, emotions have been thought adaptive because they can 
quickly reduce negative alternatives and facilitate fast and effective decision making. Some 
theorists argued that one of important sources of such emotional drives affecting decision making 
is bodily responses that are represented in brain regions (Craig, 2009; Damasio, 1994). In this 
article, empirical evidence for the functional associations of the brain and body accompanying 
decision making will be shown as follows. (1) Heart rate responses and concentration of 
inflammatory cytokine (IL-6) can predict acceptance or rejection of an unfair offer in an 
economical negotiation game, the Ultimatum Game. Activation of the anterior insula mediates 
relationship between bodily states and decision making. (2) Sympathetic responses reflected by 
secretion of adrenaline are represented in brain regions such as the midbrain, anterior cingulate 
cortex, and anterior insula, and furthermore can determine exploration of decision making in a 
situation where an action-outcome contingency is stochastic and unstable. These findings suggest 
beneficial roles of emotion and bodily responses in decision making. 
 




A 17th century philosopher, Benedict de Spinoza wrote: 
 
We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in 
preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the 
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present in preference to a greater evil in the future (Ethics, part 4, proposition 
66)1
This statement seems to represent a person who makes a rational decision, as 
traditional theories in economics have described as homo economicus (Persky, 
1995). However, Spinoza further remarked: 
. 
The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or 
pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof (Ethics, part 4, proposition 8). 
He saw through whether it is good or evil should be totally relative and we can 
have conceptions of the good or evil only thorough our experiences of positive or 
negative emotions. Therefore, our judgment of whether it is good or evil and 
preferences based on the judgment are inevitably determined by emotions. Then, 
what are emotions in this sense? 
By emotion, I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the 
said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and the ideas of such 
modifications (Ethics, part 3, definition 3). 
In this meaning, emotions are not so called basic emotions such as happiness, 
anger, sadness, or surprise, but changes of bodily states caused by external or 
internal stimuli and awareness of such bodily changes. In Spinoza's thought, we 
make decisions about what is a good thing, what we should take, and what most 
will benefit us, based on our own emotions colored by our bodily states. 
Such thoughts about emotions and decision making have been succeeded to 
modern behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. In spite of a long history of 
microeconomics supposing that our decisions are based on logical and exact 
computation of cost-benefit balances or efficacies, in the 1990s, decision making 
models (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers, 1999) where 
emotional processes play key roles were presented. Indeed, for most encounters in 
our everyday lives, the precise values of available options and the precise 
contingencies between the options and outcomes are not known. In this sense, our 
world is uncertain. We have to decide which option is good or bad, beneficial or 
threatening, and to approach or to avoid, in such uncertain situations. In such cases, 
we sometimes rely on fast, intuitive, and impulsive reactions rather than rational 
deliberation. Here, this type of decision making is called "emotional decision 
making." 
Recently, studies in cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology are 
elucidating neural mechanisms underlying such emotional decision making. 
Especially, the somatic marker hypothesis proposed by Damasio (1994) asserted 
                                                   
1 Spinoza, B. (1677). Ethics: Demonstrated in geometric order and divided into five parts, 
which treat. The original text is written in Latin and translated into English by R.H.M. 
Elwes (1883). The text is in MTSU Philosophy WebWorks Hypertext Edition 
(http://frank.mtsu.edu/~rbombard/RB/Spinoza/ethica-front.html). 
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that somatic and visceral states, which are initially produced by the amygdale and 
then mapped in the insula and anterior cingulate cortex of the brain, are critical in 
guidance of decision making by quickly reducing negative alternatives labeled by 
bodily states and unpleasant feelings associated with risk. This model can be seen 
as modern Spinozism. Indeed, Damasio (2003) paid homage for Spinoza in his 
book, and regarded Spinoza as a proto-biologist of emotions. Recently, Craig 
(2009), who argued importance of the anterior insula (particularly right side) and 
anterior cingulate cortex where integrated bodily physiological states are 
represented, has extended this notion. Furthermore, he suggested that such bodily 
signals might be conveyed to the prefrontal cortex, especially its ventromedial 
portion, which is involved in decision making. Such neuroanatomy is considered as 
the rationale of the intuitional bias of decision making by bodily states. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic Interactions between the Brain and Body  
in Decision Making 
 
The amygdala, which is modulated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
initiates cascades of emotional responses, including bodily responses. Signals of the 
bodily responses are conveyed to the brain via afferent neural routes and projected 
to the somatosensory areas and to emotional areas such as the insula and anterior 
cingulate cortex. These emotional areas have neural connections with the prefrontal 
cortex and thus can affect decision making. ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, 
VMPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Figure 1). 
This model suggests an important aspect on beneficial roles of emotions in 
decision making. Namely, emotions should have been developed in processes of 
evolution for survival of animals, and significant functions of emotions should be to 
make quick and efficient decision making possible for complex environments with 
uncertainty. Some theorists (Cabanac, 1999; Cabanac, Cabanac, & Parent, 2009) 
have argued that emotions might have emerged when animals advanced to 
terrestrial environments where were more complex and more unstable compared to 
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water environments. To adapt to such environments, animals developed a property 
to evaluate goods and things in a single mental dimension of physical 
pleasant/unpleasant, instead of simple combinations of stimuli and responses. Thus, 
a prototype of emotions was somatic and physiological hedonic states and its 
significant function was to make a decision for a behavior based on the hedonic 
value. Humans should have inherited such a property. Our bodily states associated 
with pleasant/unpleasant feelings should work as cues for adaptive decision 
making. In this sense, emotions can work a kind of "emotional intelligence" to 
solve difficult problems of decision making in uncertain situations, which 
computations only in the pure intelligence system cannot solve. 
One of the problems of the somatic marker hypothesis is that it remains unclear 
what causal roles emotions and/or physiological bodily states would play in 
decision making, and how emotions and/or bodily states would change decision 
making, especially under uncertainty. Indeed, empirical evidence about 
physiological responses accompanying decision making is still little and restricted 
to findings through skin conductance responses (Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 
2006). Furthermore, though this model argues that unpleasant feelings and somatic 
markers can reduce negative alternatives linked with risk and can contribute to 
quick decision making, generally the speed of sympathetic responses reflected by 
skin conductance responses and their afferent feedback to the brain are too slow to 
influence decision making on line. Therefore, we are conducting several lines of 
studies to expand understanding about beneficial roles of emotions and 
accompanying bodily signals in decision making. 
 
Physiological and neural correlates of economical decision making 
 
We explored possible roles of physiological bodily signals in economical 
decision making by using a well-known experimental paradigm; the Ultimatum 
Game. This task is a simple negotiation game where two players are given the 
opportunity to split a sum of money. One player takes a role of the proposer, and 
the other, the responder. The proposer makes an offer as to how this money should 
be split between the two. The responder can either accept or reject this offer. If it is 
accepted, the money is split as proposed, but if it is rejected, neither player receives 
anything. The standard economic solution to the Ultimatum Game for the 
responder is to accept any offer, even the smallest sum of money, on the reasonable 
grounds that any monetary amount is preferable to zero. However, as easily 
imagined, unfair low offers are sometimes rejected. Rejection is considered as an 
emotional decision (cf. aversion to unfairness) contrary to a rational decision of 
acceptance. Participants in this task should be faced with a conflict between the two 
options and have to overcome such a conflict to make a decision. 
As an index of physiological responses in this situation, we measured 
responders' heart rate during a task of the Ultimatum Game, time-locked to 
presentation of offers (Osumi & Ohira, 2009). Transient cardiac deceleration was 
used as an index of the orienting response. The orienting response, which usually 
happens within a few seconds after the onset of stimulus presentation, has been 
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thought to reflect perception of significance of the stimulus and capture of 
attention. The typical cardiac orienting response was observed 1 second after an 
unfair offer, only when the offer was rejected. The merit of this physiological index 
is that it is sensitive because this response is governed by the vagus nerve system 
thus can happen with a short latency, compared to sympathetic activities such as the 
skin conductance response which has been often used. In this task, it usually takes 
several seconds to make a decision. Specifically when an offer is unfair, the 
decision latency is sometimes over 5 seconds because of a conflict between a 
reasonable acceptance and an emotional rejection (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, 
Treyer, & Fehr, 2006). Our results showed that the bodily response precedes 
conscious decision making. Thus, in this sense, the body knows which alternative 
will be chosen probably before consciousness knows that. Consistently with a 
previous study (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), another study 
of ours using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) confirmed 
involvement of the anterior insula in emotional rejection in the Ultimatum Game 
(Ohira & Osumi, 2009). In this study, we made contrasts of brain activity between 
in the Ultimatum Game and in the Dictator Game where participants could not 
decide acceptance and rejection of an offer but money was automatically split as 
proposed. This comparison enables us to draw brain activation reflecting pure 
decision making processes by subtracting other processes such as evaluation about 
fairness of the offer and initial emotional reactions to the offer, which might be 
contained in both games. The results showed that activation of the right anterior 
insula robustly predicted the rejection rate of unfair offers, suggesting that the 
insula is indeed involved in decision making (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Activation of the Right Anterior Insula During a Task of the Ultimatum Game (A) 
predicted the rate of rejection of unfair offers (B), suggesting that the anterior insula, 
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Another line of evidence comes from our studies on roles of an inflammatory 
cytokine, interleukin (IL)-6 in decision making in the Ultimatum Game. Cytokines 
are proteins mainly secreted by immune cells and work for communication 
between immune cells. Some kinds of inflammatory cytokines including IL-6 can 
affect brain functions partly by afferent vagus routes and partly by breaking leaky 
sites of the blood-brain barrier. Typical effects of the inflammatory cytokines on the 
brain are known as "sickness responses" (Dantzer, O'Connor, Freund, Johnson, & 
Kelley, 2008) which are characterized by symptoms of depression-like unpleasant 
feelings, fatigue, pain, helplessness, impaired motivation and cognitive abilities, 
fever, and facilitated tones of sympathetic and endocrine activities. An fMRI study 
using vaccination to increase peripheral inflammatory cytokines revealed that 
functional neural mechanisms of the "sickness responses" are the afferent neural 
route including the midbrain, thalamus, amygdala, and finally mid/anterior insula 
(Harrison et al., 2009). Based on these previous findings, we predicted that levels of 
IL-6 could influence decision making by affecting activity of the insula. This 
prediction was confirmed by our finding that baseline levels of IL-6 negatively and 
significantly correlated with rejection rates for unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game 
(r = -.72, unpublished data): the higher concentration of IL-6 in peripheral blood, 
the lower rate of rejection for unfair offers. Furthermore, our preliminary fMRI data 
clarified that this relationship between IL-6 levels and rejection rates for unfair 
offers was mediated by activation of the insula. This study also provides further 
evidence that bodily states colored by inflammatory cytokines can modulate brain 
functions and in turn, affect decision making. It should be noted that participants 
did not precisely recognize their heart rate orienting response, cytokine levels, and 
the degrees of activation in their insula cortex. Furthermore, participants' rating of 
their subjective affective states (cf. pleasant-unpleasant) did not predict their 
decision making. Thus, the somatic marker can work implicitly and almost 
unconsciously. 
Specific responses of psychopathic individuals in the Ultimatum Game also 
provide an insight about roles of emotions in decision making (Osumi et al., 2009). 
Psychopathic individuals often involve antisocial behaviors with no regard for 
social norms or relationships with other people. The hallmark of psychopathy is an 
affective impairment. Psychopathic individuals fail to elicit electrodermal responses 
and reduced activation of the affective neural circuit in responses to aversive 
stimuli (Benning, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005; Birbaumer et al., 2005; Osumi, 
Shimazaki, Imai, Sugiura, & Ohira, 2007). In line with that notion, we inferred that 
psychopathic individuals would show less involvement of their emotions and thus 
rather show more rationality in decision making. Our results supported this 
prediction. Normal adults with high tendency of psychopathy who played the 
Ultimatum Game as the responders indicated lack of the cardiac orienting 
responses and insular activation, and less rejection to unfair offers, compared to 
their counterpart with low tendency of psychopathy. Psychopathic individuals show 
more rational decision making like homo economicus as traditional economics 
models described (Persky, 1995) or utilitarian, probably because of their 
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impairment of emotions and accompanying bodily responses2
 
. 
Sympathetic bodily responses mediates exploration-exploitation trade-off in 
uncertain decision making 
 
Two typical strategies of decision making are known: exploration and 
exploitation. Exploration is a strategy characterized by trying new options and 
actions to seeking for reward and resource usually in trial-and-error manners. On 
the other hand, exploitation is a strategy characterized by sticking to currently 
appropriate options and actions to maintain reward and resource. For survival of 
animals, the balance of exploration and exploitation is critical in choices of meals 
and mates. The balance of the two strategies is observed in relatively primitive 
animals such as fungi that is faced against a conflict between growth at local site or 
sending out hyphae to distant site, or ants who are wondering whether they should 
settle at the current site or build a new nest (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007). 
Generally, exploitation is a better policy when environments are stable because 
such a policy can provide promising reward with minimum costs. However, when 
environments are instable, animals including humans have to adopt exploration to 
find changes of environment, to get possible reward, and to avoid possible risks. 
However, because the total amount of resource is limited, relationship between 
exploration and exploitation should be trade-off. We must decide at how much rates 
we should take exploration and at how much rates we should take exploitation. The 
most difficult problem is, as our situations are usually uncertain, it is not clear how 
much rate of mixing of the two strategies is the most adaptive. How can we solve 
this problem and decide rates of the two options in a specific situation? Especially, 
how can animals and humans overcome temptation of exploitative sticking to 
previously acquired rewarding options and drive themselves into potentially risky 
exploration, even when environments are instable? We speculate that emotions and 
accompanying bodily states forcibly determine it and make us to choose an option 
at a specific moment. This might be one of beneficial roles of emotions in decision 
making. 
To examine this hypothesis, we recently conducted a combined neuroimaging 
study using 15O-positron emission tomography (PET) and measurement of 
sympathetic activities (heart rate, heart rate variability, blood pressure, and 
concentrations of adrenaline and noradrenaline) during a stochastic reversal 
learning task, which can simulate instable contingencies between options, and 
outcomes (unpublished data). In this task, participants chose one of two stimuli to 
gain monetary reward. One advantageous stimulus was associated with reward at a 
probability of 70% whereas another disadvantageous stimulus was associated with 
                                                   
2 Of course, behaviors of psychopathic individuals should highly depend on situations and 
game contexts. We indicated that they less rejected unfair offer in a single trial Ultimatum 
Game where rejection cannot affect the proposer. However, it is predicted that they might 
more reject unfair offers in a repeated trial Ultimatum Game where rejection can work as a 
threat to the proposer and result in increase of gain. 
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reward at a probability of 30%. Participants did not know this contingency and thus 
they have to find it though trials and errors. In an initial learning stage, they 
conducted 120 trials of this task. After that, in a reversal learning stage with another 
120 trials, the contingency between options and outcomes was suddenly reversed 
without any explicit instructions; the previously advantageous stimulus became 
disadvantageous (30% reward) and the previously disadvantageous stimulus 
became advantageous (70% reward), respectively. In this stage, participants had to 
suppress the dominant tendency to choose the previous advantageous option and to 
learn new contingency. Probably another important thing for them is that they learnt 
that contingencies between options and outcomes are not stable but variable in their 
experimental situation. 
To evaluate the degree of exploration, we calculated Shanon's conditional 
entropy (H) as an index of the amount of randomness of choices (Advantageous 
stimulus vs. Disadvantageous stimulus) under states of outcomes in the previous 
trial (Reward vs. Non-reward). A conditional probability (a probability of a 









where Num(a|S) is a number of selection of a behavior a under a state S. Num(k|S) 
is a number of total behaviors k under a state S. A constant c is fixed to 1 here. 






where N is a number of states S. H = 0 means null randomness and H = 1 means 
complete randomness. 
A regression analysis revealed that increase of peripheral adrenaline was 
associated with increase of entropy of decision making during the reversal learning 
stage (β=.43, p<.05). Thus, increased sympathetic activity leads to facilitation of 
exploration in decision making. Analyses of PET images showed that increase of 
peripheral adrenaline during reversal learning correlated activation in the anterior 
insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsal pons, which are main sites of 
afferent routes from the body to the brain. In addition, increase of entropy of 
decision making during reversal learning correlated activation in the anterior insula 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Finally, a statistical mediation analysis revealed 
that activation of the insula mediated association between sympathetic activity 
reflected by increase of adrenaline and entropy of decision making during reversal 
learning (Figure 3). Taken together, bodily states reflected by sympathetic activity 
can work as a source of judgment about the trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation. Briefly, animals and humans might become more explorative when 
they are more excited. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 20 (2011), 3, 381-392 
 
389 
Figure 3. Activation of the right insula during a stochastic reversal learning task mediates a 
















However, on the other hand, we should also notice that bodily states could be 
modulated based on evaluation of contingencies between options and outcomes. 
We previously showed that suppression of cardiovascular responses happened 
within few minutes after onset of the decision making task under uncertainty 
(Kimura, Ohira, Isowa, Matsunaga, & Murashima, 2007). Probably, this 
phenomenon might be interpreted as an energy-saving coping to an uncertain 
situation. Allocation of much biological energy in such a situation might be 
dangerous. We further indicated that neural basis of this phenomenon is the top-
down control by the anterior cingulate cortex of the brain over cardiovascular 
activities via modulation of sympathetic and parasympathetic activities (Ohira et 
al., 2010). Thus, a bi-directional circuit between the brain and body is continuously 
working to evaluate contingencies between available options and possible 
outcomes, to modulate decision making and behaviors optimally, and to adapt to 
given environments. Bodily signals represented the somatic marker can be 





As described above, cumulating evidence has clarified that emotions and 
accompanying bodily states are substantially associated with decision making. This 
phenomenon should be a key to explore roles of emotions as a manifestation of 
implicit emotional intelligence, which makes beneficial contributions for our 
adaptation to environments. However, it should be considered whether emotions 
are always beneficial and adaptive in decision making. 
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Rational decisions without emotional responses in the Ultimatum Game 
typically observed in psychopaths or homo economicus can provide monetary 
reward. Thus, at least in a short-term range, rational acceptance is more adaptive 
compared to emotional rejection. However, such rational decision might be harmful 
in a long-term range, probably by reducing reputation of the person in his/her group 
("He/She is a chicken"), and then by increased risk of intimidation or betrayal. In 
this sense, by emotions, we can overcome the short-term utilitarianism and chose 
more long-term beneficial options (e.g. altruistic punishment, reputation). However, 
too strong emotional responses might make negotiation impossible and harm social 
adaptation. On the other hand, a cool-headed exploitation strategy can promise 
constant reward at least in a short-term range. However, it might be harmful to stick 
to the currently and locally most optimal option, because such policy can miss 
potential larger reward. However, again in this case, too strong emotions might lead 
to too instable and mostly random decisions, which are apparently maladaptive. 
Taken together, influences of emotions on decision making are linked both merits 
and demerits. Therefore, appropriate regulation of emotions and optimal tuning of 
emotional influences on decision making is critical for adaptation. Detailed 
mechanisms of such regulation and tuning of emotions which might be embedded 
in our biological systems are very open for future research. 
Finally, I would like to close this article by Spinoza' words: 
... a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or 
rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision ... (Ethics, part 3, 
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